We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which two or more senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. The model's primitives that define the competitive environment are: the ex-ante correlation of senders' proposal qualities; the respective ex-ante expected proposal qualities; and the number of competing senders. Based on the finding that each sender must face a payoff function with a linear structure in equilibria, we fully characterize the unique equilibrium. We then identify the effects of the primitives on senders' disclosure strategies. We find that an increase in the ex-ante correlation has two opposing effects on the incentives for information disclosure. Full disclosure arises in the limit as the correlation approaches its maximum value if and only if there exists difference in expected qualities. Furthermore, we show that as the number of competing senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure arises in the limit.
graduates. In order to boost their placement records, professional schools and universities design their grading and disclosure policies to convince prospective employers that their graduates are of higher quality compared to other competing institutions. (1) Another example is pharmaceutical companies submitting comprehensive plans for clinical trials to the authority for their drugs' approval. Prior to the trials, no party has superior information about the efficacy of the new drugs. Since pharmaceutical companies are allowed to advertise its drugs' efficacy based only on the results of clinical trials, positive results would significantly help convincing physicians to adopt the drug.
In the examples above, self-interested senders (e.g. universities) seek to influence a receiver's beliefs and actions (e.g. potential employer's perception of students' ability and their hiring decisions). Unlike typical principal-agent models, standard tools, such as contracts or monetary incentive schemes, are not available to the senders. Instead, they must convince the receiver by designing an information structure (e.g. grading policies and clinical trials) that selectively reveals the relevant information (e.g., students' abilities).
To understand the basic trade-off that senders face, consider first a hypothetical scenario where all universities adopt a simple pass/fail grading policy. Universities are competing for job placements for their graduates. By suppressing information using grade inflation (i.e. occasionally passing bad students), a university can boost the career prospects of bad students. However, the cost involved is a decline in the career prospects of good students.
Highly-ranked universities are more likely to inflate grades, arguing that the higher proportion of high grades reflect the higher abilities of the student body. This result means that grades are less informative to receiver (i.e. employer). Faced with this behavior from higher-ranked universities, lower-ranked universities have an opportunity to improve their overall job placement record by improving the perception of their top students. One strategy to achieve this is to adopt a finer scale grading system (for example, a letter grade system from A to F) which distinguishes the top students from the rest. Alternatively they may mandate the use of a forced curve, or report an average grade in each class alongside the grade received by a student. No matter the strategy adopted, competitive pressures from higher ranked universities force lower ranked universities to disclose more information. In response to this, higher universities may seek to differentiate their top students by adopting the same finer scale grading system and disclosing more information.
Is the competitive pressure from the lower-ranked universities strong enough to force higher-ranked universities to disclose more information about their graduates? Are there conditions under which uni-(1) Kolotilin (2015) analyzes the situation where there is only one university, but a potential employer can acquire information not only from the university but also from other sources. He derives the necessary and sufficient conditions for full and no information revelation.
versities would adopt a full-disclosure policy? In this paper, we are interested in characterizing equilibria of this game (i.e. a grading policy for each university that are mutually best responses), and comparative statics with respect to the primitives that define the competitive environments: (i) the average quality of students in each university; (ii) the similarity or correlation in students' abilities across universities; and (iii) the number of universities competing in placing their students.
Specifically, we analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which two or more senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposals. We begin our analysis with a binary state space model, i.e., each sender's proposal is either of high quality or low quality to the receiver. Ex-ante, there is no information asymmetry, and all players share a common prior belief concerning the joint distribution over the proposals' qualities. We assume that each sender can only directly control the disclosure of information regarding its own proposal's quality. As pointed out by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) , it is without loss of generality to formulate the problem of each sender as choosing a distribution over marginal posterior beliefs that respects Bayes rule. Moreover, optimizing the posterior distribution is equivalent to finding the concave closure of the sender's payoff as a function of realized posteriors. In Section 2, we illustrate that this reformulation of the sender's problem have strong implications on their equilibrium payoff functions. In particular, they must exhibit a specific linear structure, which in turn allows us to back out the unique equilibrium in the game.
In Section 3, we analyze the game played by two (possibly) asymmetric senders, with a positive correlation in their proposal qualities. A novel feature in this setting with positive correlation is the presence of information externality: the news disclosed by a sender contains information about the other sender's proposal. Due to the informational externality, an increase in the positive correlation in the proposals' qualities have two opposing effects.
With a positive correlation, when the news delivered by a sender is good, it is likely that the other sender's news is also good. Therefore, fixing the other sender's strategy, a larger information externality implies the diminished marginal benefit of delivering good news. This effect would soften the competition. At the same time, we find that the informational externality always favors the strong sender if two senders differ in the ex-ante expected qualities of their proposal. Specifically, the receiver chooses the weak sender's proposal only if the weak sender's news is sufficiently better than the one delivered by the strong sender. This unequal treatment by the receiver creates the incentive for the weak sender to disclose aggressively, and in turn induces a more aggressive response by the strong sender. As a result, an increase in the positive correlation in the proposals' qualities would intensify competition and lead to more equilibrium disclosure by both senders.
We show that as the correlation approaches its maximal value, irrespective of how small the ex-ante difference in qualities is, the latter effect dominates the former effect, and hence competition becomes so intense to the point that both senders engage in full disclosure in the unique limit equilibrium. As suggested by the discussion above, when two senders are symmetric, the channel through which the informational externality intensify the receiver's unequal treatment of senders, i.e., only the former effect exists. Consequently, as the correlation of ex-ante increases, the senders disclose less information as the correlation increases.
In Section 4, we analyze the effect of the number of competing senders on equilibrium disclosure policies. For simplicity and transparency, we abstract away from any correlation among senders' qualities, as well as any asymmetry in expected qualities. Specifically, we consider a disclosure game with multiple symmetric senders, each endowed with an independent proposal. We establish that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. Intuitively, competition gets more intense with a larger number of senders, and each sender finds that a more transparent disclosure policy is necessary to stand a chance in persuading the receiver. We show that as the number of senders increases, each sender uses a more informative disclosure policy in the unique symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, as the number of senders approaches infinity, each sender's strategy converges to full disclosure.
We then generalize the model to allow for an arbitrarily number of possible quality realizations. Unlike the binary case, since each posterior belief is multi-dimensional, a sender's payoff function over posteriors is no longer homeomorphic to his payoff function over expected quality induced by respective posteriors. Consequently, the linearity of equilibrium payoff function of posteriors does not translate into the linearity of equilibrium payoff function of expected qualities in a straightforward manner. Nevertheless, we show that if we recast the problem to the one of choosing a distribution over expected qualities (rather than choosing a distribution over posteriors), the linearity of equilibrium payoff function remains valid locally, with a possibility of upward kinks at interim qualities. We establish that these properties of the payoff functions over expected qualities are necessary and sufficient condition for the linearity of the payoff function with respect to posteriors. These properties also inform us of a simple algorithm that constructs the unique symmetric equilibrium. Finally, we show that the equilibrium strategy approaches full disclosure as the number of senders goes to infinity.
As discussed above, the technique developed by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) plays a key role in our analysis. Their article has stimulated an active literature on information disclosure game in which the sender(s) can commit to the disclosure mechanism. Below, we discuss a number of articles from the literature that study competition among senders. (2) (2) Information transmission with multiple senders has been studied using frameworks different from Bayesian persuasion. For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) studied a multi-senders persuasion game in which the receiver is unsophisticated. They identify sufficient conditions on senders' preference for the unique equilibrium to be fully revealing. In contrast, we consider fully sophisticated receiver, endogenous senders' information, and comparative statics on the effect of competition. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) consider costly information acquisition and show that hiring advocates with opposed interests generates information Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) considers a model setup similar to ours. In their model, schools disclose information about the ability of their students, with the objective of maximizing the students' overall placement. Their focus is whether the aggregate information disclosed in equilibrium depends on the distribution of students' abilities across the school. In their setup, each sender's choice of disclosure policy is assumed to have negligible effects on other senders' payoff functions. In contrast, we focus on equilibrium characterization and the effect of competition on individual sender's disclosure policy in an environment where each sender's choice of disclosure policy has non-negligible effects on other sender's payoff. Boleslavsky and Cotton (2016) analyzes a game that is a special case of ours (two senders with independent proposals and the underlying state is binary). (3) Their equilibrium construction is based on the observation that a sender's incentive is similar to that of complete-information all-pay auction. In contrast, our approach builds upon the linear structure of payoff functions. Because of its versatility, our approach allows us to tackle more general settings with state-correlation and multiple senders. Hoffmann et al. (2014) analyzes a situation where there exists informational asymmetry among players because each sender decides whether to acquire better private information about the quality of his proposal. By assuming that a sender can choose only one of two commonly known disclosure policies and the independence of proposal qualities, they show that competition leads to the choice of the more informative disclosure policy. In our model, there exists no information asymmetry among senders. However, we neither restrict the choice of information disclosure mechanisms to be binary, nor assume the independence of proposal qualities, and offer full characterizations of equilibria.
Except the aforementioned papers, most studies on competitive Bayesian persuasion assume that the senders share a common state of the world, and each one can independently disclose information on the common state to a single receiver. Allowing each sender to adopt a mechanism that is arbitrarily correlated with each other, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2015a) provide a simple equilibrium characterization.
Furthermore, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2015b) identify a necessary and sufficient condition on the set of feasible disclosure mechanisms under which the equilibrium outcome is more informative with an additional sender (regardless of preferences). The game we analyze does not satisfy their condition, so their result is not applicable in this scenario. Li and Norman (2015) provide an example that if only (conmore effectively. In contrast, we abstract away from the moral hazard cost involved in information acquisition and focus on the aforementioned trade-off involved in the design of information structure. Finally, there is a large literature that examines the conflict of interests among senders in the cheap-talk settings. For example, Morgan and Krishna (2001) extends Crawford and Sobel (1982) to a setting with two senders and show that a full-revelation equilibrium exists if the senders have opposing bias. In addition, Battaglini (2002) shows that with two senders and a multidimensional state space, a full-revelation equilibrium generically exists. Kawai (2015) generalizes the finding of Morgan and Krishna (2001) to multi-dimensional state space.
(3) We thank Raphael Boleslavsky for bringing this paper into our attention.
ditionally) independent mechanisms are feasible for each sender, the equilibrium outcome can be less informative with an additional sender. Board and Lu (2015) consider a search environment in which a buyer (receiver) sequentially learns from senders of a homogeneous product about its attributes. Restricting to (conditionally) independent mechanisms, they show that if the buyer's search history is private, full disclosure is the unique equilibrium outcome as the search cost vanishes. We obtain a somewhat similar result, but in the context of simultaneous disclosure about differentiated products. Au (2015) analyzes a dynamic disclosure setting with a single sender. In the absence of commitment power, the sender faces competition with his future selves. Our paper differs from these articles in that we assume that each sender can only disclose information about his proposal and that it is infeasible for him to reveal any information about other senders' proposal.
Linear Structure of Equilibrium Payoff
As the linear structure of equilibrium payoff function plays a crucial role in subsequent analysis, we illustrate its intuition in the simplest version of our model in this section. There are two (male) risk-neutral senders, each of whom is endowed with a proposal. They engage in competition for the endorsement of a single (female) receiver. The quality of proposal by sender i = 1, 2 is denoted by U i , which takes a value of either u 0 or u 1 > u 0 . For each i, U i is independently and identically distributed with a commonly known prior distribution, characterized by π ≡ Pr (U i = u 1 ).
Denote a generic element of ∆ ({u 0 , u 1 }) by p i ∈ [0, 1], standing for the probability that U i = u 1 .
Sender i's strategy space is a Bayes-plausible distribution over posteriors, i.e., set of distribution functions
The receiver is an expected-utility-maximizer. Therefore, given a pair of realized posteriors p i , p j , she chooses seller i with probability one if p i > p j ; and with probability 1/2 if p i = p j . A sender's objective is to maximize the probability that the receiver chooses his proposal.
Thus, when sender i's strategy is G i , sender j's expected payoff of inducing posterior p is
Below, we show that a Bayes-plausible distribution G is a symmetric equilibrium strategy if and only if it induces a payoff function Π (p; G) that has the linear structure, as depicted in Figure 1 . More formally, we say Π (p; G) has the linear structure if there existp ∈ (0, 1] and a linear functionΠ (p)
We explain below why a strategy G constitutes a symmetric equilibrium if Π (p; G) has the linear structure. Given a strategy G i , sender i can disclose more information than G i by a mean-preserving
Figure 1: Shape of Equilibrium Payoff spread of G i . Conversely, sender i can disclose less information than G i by a mean-preserving contraction of G i . In an equilibrium, no sender strictly benefits from engaging in such spreading (more information disclosure) or contraction (less information disclosure).
More information disclosure through spreading increases a sender's payoff if his payoff function is "locally convex" or has an "upward-kink". In Figure 2 -(a), given a sender j's strategy
. In this case, sender i has incentives to spread the weight in the neighborhood of p to those of p and p , and p is not in the support of sender i's best response. Therefore, such G j cannot be a symmetric equilibrium strategy. In contrast, less information disclosure through contraction increases a sender's payoff if his payoff function is "locally concave" or has an "non-upward-kink". In Figure 2 -(b), given some G j , Π p, G j is increasing at both p and p , and that
would not find it optimal to use a strategy that assigns positive measures on the neighborhoods of both p and p . By using another strategy that contracts these measures to p in a mean-preserving manner would strictly increase sender i's payoff. Therefore, it cannot be the case that sender i's best response put positive weights on both the neighborhoods of p and p , and such G j cannot be a symmetric equilibrium strategy. When the payoff function facing a sender has the linear structure, he cannot strictly benefit from any form of spreading or contraction. Consequently, using the same strategy as the other sender is one of the best responses.
Next, we explain why it is necessary that Π (p; G) has the linear structure in an equilibrium. This is less straightforward than the sufficiency of the linear structure for equilibrium. For example, one may wonder why there is no equilibrium in which both senders engage in full information disclosure, i.e., equilibrium in which senders use strategy G (p) = 1 − π for p ∈ [0, 1) and G (1) = 1. In this case, sender 1's payoff function has a jump at p = 0. Therefore, sender 1 can profitably deviate by replacing the atom 1−ε respectively. The expected payoff of this strategy is represented by the red point on the solid red line in Figure 2 -(c), which is higher than the blue point. The same logic implies that if sender i assigns an atom at p ∈ [0, 1), sender j would find it strictly suboptimal to assign an atom at p. As a result, in every symmetric equilibrium, no sender assigns an atom at any p ∈ [0, 1), i.e., G has to be continuous on [0, 1), and
Furthermore, an equilibrium payoff function can be flat only at the top. To see this, suppose that G j is constant on interval (a, b) and is increasing in interval (b, c), then Π p; G j would have an upwardkink at b. As argued above, sender i would find it strictly suboptimal to put positive weight in the neighborhood of b, and G j cannot be a symmetric equilibrium strategy. Thus, a necessary condition for G being a symmetric equilibrium strategy is that G is increasing and continuous in interval [0,p] 
Finally, if G is a symmetric equilibrium strategy, then it is necessary that it induces a payoff function Π (p; G) such that all posteriors in the support of G lie on a linear line, i.e., the linear lineΠ (p) that connects (0, Π (0; G)) and (p, Π (p; G)). Were this not the case, there exists p in the support of G such that For each prior π, the linear structure of the equilibrium payoff function, along with the Bayes-plausibility uniquely identify the symmetric equilibrium strategy. Moreover, as the game is zero-sum, the interchangeability property of zero-sum games then immediately implies that there is no asymmetric equilibrium. Consequently, the symmetric equilibrium identified above is the unique equilibrium.
In the following sections, we show that the observations that the equilibrium payoff function must have the linear structure, and equilibrium uniqueness, can be generalized to environments in which the two senders are asymmetric and their proposals' quality are correlated; as well as environments in which there are more than two senders or more than three possible proposal qualities.
Correlated States and Asymmetric Senders

Model
In this section, we study the disclosure game played between two (possibly) asymmetric senders, whose proposal's qualities U 1 and U 2 are (possibly) positively correlated. Specifically, given a pair of prior expected qualities E [U 1 ] = π 1 and E [U 2 ] = π 2 , and the covariance between the qualities of two proposals ρ ≡ cov (U 1 , U 2 ), the joint distribution of U 1 and U 2 is tabulated below.
It is without loss of generality to assume π 1 ≥ π 2 > 0. Under this assumption, sender 1 is "weakly stronger" than sender 2. Moreover, we assume that ρ ∈ [0,ρ), whereρ ≡ π 2 (1 − π 1 ) which ensures that the joint distribution of U 1 and U 2 has a full support.
Each sender i simultaneously chooses an information disclosure mechanism on U i , which consists of a signal space M i and a conditional distribution
The choices of disclosure mechanisms are known to the receiver before she makes her decision. After observing the disclosure mechanisms and realized signals of both senders, the receiver decides which sender's proposal to adopt.
Notice that the information disclosure mechanism on U i induces a distribution of marginal distributions over U i . A realized marginal distribution over U i is one-dimensional, and a generic distribution is denoted by p i = Pr (U i = u 1 |p i ). We will refer this as sender i's realized signal. As the receiver is an expected-utility maximizer, for a realized pair of signals (p 1 , p 2 ), she chooses sender i with prob-
In the case of a tie, i.e., Pr U i = u 1 |p i , p j = Pr U j = u 1 |p i , p j , we assume that she randomizes equally between the two senders. A sender's objective is to maximize the probability that the receiver chooses his proposal.
As pointed out by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) , there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of feasible disclosure mechanisms and Bayes-plausible (marginal) distributions of posterior beliefs over {u 0 , u 1 }. It is therefore without loss of generality to focus on the game of information disclosure played among the senders, in which the set of pure strategies of sender i consists of all Bayes-plausible (marginal) distributions over signals. (5) Furthermore, for each mixed strategy, there exists a pure strategy that preserves the expected payoffs of all players. Therefore, without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game described above.
Equilibrium
In this subsection, we show that an equilibrium in the disclosure game with quality correlation exhibits a linear structure similar to that described in Section 2, with a few notable modifications. We first illustrate a key implication of the correlation between senders' qualities. Observe that because of the quality correlation, sender i's signal p i is informative not only of its own quality U i , but also of the other sender's quality U j , i.e., Pr
this information externality
effect always favors the strong sender, i.e., sender 1. To gain some intuition, suppose the disclosure mechanism of the weak sender, sender 2, generates a good signal p 2 > π 2 , whereas that of sender 1 generates a neutral signal p 1 = π 1 . Then sender 1 benefits from sender 2's good signal because
As Pr (U 2 = u 1 |p 1 = π 1 , p 2 ) = p 2 , the receiver chooses sender 2's proposal only if his signal p 2 exceeds π 1 by a sufficiently large margin, i.e.,
. In contrast, sender 1's good news does not benefit sender 2. To see this, suppose sender 1 has a good signal p 1 > π 1 , whereas sender 2 has a neutral signal p 2 = π 2 . Then
so sender 1 is chosen with probability one. Although a good signal of sender 1 raises the posterior of sender 2's proposal, the increase is never enough to make the receiver adopt sender 2's proposal.
The examples above illustrate that the information externality effect works in the favor of the strong sender. It is straightforward to show, by a direct application of Bayes' rule, that for all p ∈ (0, 1),
See Proposition 1 of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) .
. Therefore, the receiver chooses the strong sender's proposal with certainty even if its signal is slightly worse than that of the weak sender. This unequal treatment of senders is illustrated in Figure 3 . The shaded area in Figure 3 represents the set of signal pairs following which the receiver chooses sender 2. Apparently, the area lies strictly above the 45-degree line.
If ρ = 0, i.e., the proposals' qualities are independent, then the aforementioned unequal treatment disappears and sender 1 is chosen with certainty if and only of p 1 > p 2 . As ρ increases, the favorable treatment for sender 1 becomes more significant, as illustrated in Figure 3 . The region of signal pairs following which sender 2 is chosen shrinks as ρ gets larger. The observations above are formally stated in the lemma below.
Lemma 1 Suppose (p 1 , p 2 ) is a pair of realized signals. There exists an increasing concave function δ :
Given Lemma 1, we can derive the senders' payoff functions According to Lemma 1, δ 1 (p) = δ 2 (p) = p if U 1 and U 2 are independently or identically distributed.
We have shown in Section 2 that if ρ = 0 and π 1 = π 2 , the necessary and sufficient condition for the unique symmetric equilibrium is the linearity of the payoff function. Also, the heuristic argument in the previous section suggests that the senders cannot both assign an atom at posterior 0, as each sender would have a profitable deviation to replace the atom at posterior 0 with another atom at a small and positive posterior (in a mean-preserving manner).
The finding that the linearity of payoff functions is necessary and sufficient for an equilibrium can be extended to the current environment, with a few modifications. First, due to sender's asymmetry, sender i's payoff function is different from sender j's payoff function. Secondly, with a positive correlation, a payoff function is not necessarily weakly increasing in the signal a sender induces, as one can see in Figure 4 -(a). Also following an argument similar to that in Section 2, the support of sender i's equilibrium strategy takes the form of either [0, 
As the following theorems show, this linear structure Theorem 1 A pair of Bayes-plausible strategies (G 1 , G 2 ) is an equilibrium if and only if it induces a pair of payoff functions with the linear structure.
As the following lemma shows, the linear structure of payoff function found in Theorem 1 implies that the search of an equilibrium boils down to solving a system of 6 equations with 6 unknownsp i ,
To see this, observe that the linear structure of payoff function implies d 2 Π i p i ; G j /dp 2 i = 0 for p i ∈ (0,p i ), which gives us a differential equation with respect to G j . Upon solving, we can represent G j as a function of G j (0) and G j p j . Consequently, the Bayes-plausibility for sender j can also be written as a function of G j (0) and
The linear structure of payoff functions thus implies
. Together with conditions (v) and (iv) of the linear structure of payoff function, we have the following lemma.
where
Furthermore, as the following theorem shows, this system of equations identifies the unique equilibrium of this game.
Theorem 2 An equilibrium exists and is unique.
Effects of ρ on Equilibrium Information Disclosure
In this subsection, we analyze the limit of the unique equilibrium where the parameter ρ that captures the degree of correlation is taken toρ ≡ π 2 (1 − π 1 ). The change in ρ has two opposing effects for the equilibrium information disclosure, both of which arise from the aforementioned information externality effect. The first effect is due to the change in the marginal benefit of inducing higher signals, which disincentiveizes senders to engage in aggressive information discosure. The second effect arises from the receiver's asymmetric treatment of senders that exists only when π 1 > π 2 , which creates the incentives to engage in aggressive information disclosure.
We start with the first effect that diminishes the incetives to disclose information. Notice the larger information externality effect implies that, fixing the other senders's strategy, the increase in ρ diminishes the marginal benefit of inducing a higher signal. For example, if ρ > 0 and the other sender engages full information disclosure, then a sender's payoff is decreasing in the signal he induces on (0, 1) as depicted in Figure 4 -(a).
To illustrate this first effect more formally, suppose two senders are symmetric, i.e., π 1 = π 2 . We say sender i's strategy G discloses more information than strategy G , which is denoted by G G , if G and G satisfy the following relationship: there exist a p L ∈ (0, 1) and
Loosely speaking, G is a "clock-wise rotation" of G in the sense strategy
and good signals (p > p L ) more frequently than strategy G . Therefore, G G implies G is second-order stochastically dominated by G (but not vice versa). Also we use G ρ to denote the unique equilibrium strategy for a given ρ; and G N to denote the strategy that corresponds to no information disclosure, i.e.,
As the following theorem shows that as ρ increases, each sender discloses less information in the unique equilibrium as depicted in Figure 6 . However, even in the limit where ρ →ρ, each sender discloses some information, i.e., G does not converge to G N in distribution.
Theorem 3 Suppose senders are symmetric, i.e., π 1 = π 2 = π. If the degree of correlation increases, then each sender discloses less information. More formally,
Figure 6: Equilibrium Strategy
Observe that in the game with ρ =ρ and π 1 = π 2 , any pair of strategies is an equilibrium, including the one in which both senders engage in full information disclosure. Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that the game with ρ =ρ and π 1 > π 2 also possesses a plethora of equilibria, including the one in which sender 2 engages in full disclosure, and sender 1 engages in "almost" full disclosure. (9) . In light of Theorem 3, one may expect, even when π 1 > π 2 , the full information disclosure does not result as the limit of the unique equilibrium where ρ is taken toρ because an increase in positive correlation diminishes the marginal benefit of information disclosure.
As we have discussed in the previous subsection, however, a larger value of ρ strengthens the information externality effect, and consequently the receiver's bias against sender 2 when π 1 > π 2 . As sender 2 is treated less favorably by the receiver, he would respond by more aggressive disclosure. Recall that δ (p) → 1 as ρ →ρ, i.e., the receiver chooses sender 2 with probability 1 only when p 2 is sufficiently close to 1. Therefore, loosely speaking, sender 2 can persuade the receiver only when it induces p 2 = 1, and he can maximize the probability of inducing p 2 = 1 by engaging in the full disclosure no matter how small the difference in π 1 and π 2 is. Such competitive pressure from sender 2 in turn induces sender 1 to disclose information more aggressively. As we formally show in the following theorem, this second effect dominates the first effect as ρ →ρ, and hence the full disclosure arises in the limit.
To formally state the result, we use G iF to denote the strategy of full disclosure, i.e.,
to denote the pair of equilibrium (9) The reason is as follows. Observe first that with ρ = π 2 (1 − π 1 ),
and Pr (U 2 = u 1 |p 1 = 0, p 2 < 1) < 1. Therefore, sender 2, maximizing the probability of inducing p 2 = 1, i.e., engaging in full disclosure, is a dominant strategy. When sender 2 engages in full disclosure, Π 1 (0; G 2 ) = 1/2, and Π 1 (p; G 2 ) is constant on p ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, for any ε > 0, inducing signals ε and 1 with probabilities 1−π 1−ε and π−ε 1−ε , respectively, is a best-response to sender 2's full disclosure. strategies and the concave closure of Π 1 p; G ρ 2 , respectively, when the covariance is ρ.
Theorem 4 Fix the prior expected qualities π 1 and π 2 and suppose π 1 > π 2 . In the limit as ρ converges tō ρ ≡ π 2 (1 − π 1 ), both senders engage in full disclosure, and the receiver chooses sender 1 with probability one.
That is, G ρ i converges to G iF in distribution as ρ →ρ; and lim ρ→ρΠ1 π 1 ; G ρ 2 = 1.
Multiple Senders
Binary Qualities
In the previous section, we saw that neither the large covariance alone nor difference in priors alone is sufficient to lead to full information disclosure. Full information disclosure results only when two senders are asymmetric and the qualities of two senders' proposals are maximally correlated. In this section, we analyze another element that affects the equilibrium information disclosure: the number of senders. To highlight the effect of competition that purely arises from the number of senders, we consider the game among N symmetric senders, i.e., π i = π ∈ (0, 1) for all i = 1, · · · , N, where the qualities of proposals are independent; and we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria.
To proceed, we first describe sender i's expected payoff when all other senders use strategy G (p).
Notice that if he induces a signal p, the receiver chooses him with probability 1 k+1 if p is the highest signal among all senders and there are k other senders with signal p. Therefore, his expected payoff of inducing signal p is
Recall the linear structure mentioned of payoff function in Section 2. The linear structure is the necessary and sufficient condition for the unique equilibrium, which happens to be symmetric. The identical argument that lead to this conclusion gives us that the linear structure is the necessary and sufficient condition for the unique symmetric equilibrium. More specifically, we say that G induces a payoff function with the linear structure if there existp ∈ (0, 1] and a linear functionΠ : Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between a strategy and the induced payoff function with the linear structure.
Theorem 5 A Bayes-plausible distribution G is a symmetric equilibrium if and only if G induces a payoff function that has the linear structure. The symmetric equilibrium is unique. 
Extension
In this subsection, we consider the extension of the symmetric game where the quality of a proposal can be any of element in Ω ≡ {u 0 , u 1 , ..., u M−1 }, u m < u m+1 . The purpose is to highlight how the linear structure of the payoff function found in binary state case can be extended to more general settings.
Before proceeding, we make a few preliminary observations. First, a belief on Ω, which is an element of ∆Ω, is represented by a non-negative vector (p 0 , p 1 , · · · , p M−1 ) satisfying ∑ M−1 k=0 p k = 1. We assume that each U i is distributed according to a commonly known prior distribution π = (π 0 , π 1 , · · · , π M−1 ), which is in interior of ∆Ω. (10) Next, a sender's strategy space is set of all Bayes-plausible distributions over posterior distributions. Observe that a sender's strategy G ∈ ∆ (∆Ω) induces a distribution over the (10) As it was the case for m = 2, whether or not that each U i is independently distributed does not affects the analysis below.
ex-post expected qualities; and the receiver selects the sender that gives her the highest expected quality according to the induced distribution. Therefore, a sender's payoff depends on his realized posterior only through the value of expected quality it induces. More specifically, if other N − 1 senders use strategy a strategy G that induces the distribution F G over expected qualities, then the expected payoff of inducing
Notice that as it was the case for binary-quality case, in an equilibrium a sender neither benefits from more information disclosure, i.e., spreading of posteriors he induces; nor less information disclosure, i.e., contraction of posterior he induces. Therefore, following the same arguments for the previous sections, it is not difficult to see that a Bayes-plausible distribution G over posterior distributions is a symmetric equilibrium strategy if and only if it induces the payoff function Π posterior (p; G) defined (4) with the linear structure, i.e., there existû ∈ (u 0 ,
Theorem 7 G is a symmetric equilibrium strategy if and only if it induces Π (p; G) with the linear structure. 
When there is no confusion, we omit G from Π (u; G) for expositional simplicity.
One may conjecture that the linear structure of Π posterior (p; G) implies the linear structure of Π (u; G)
However, this conjecture turns out to be false. To see why, recall that when the quality is binary, an interior posterior can always be spread. In contrast, in the current environment, an interior expected quality u ∈ (u 0 , u 1 ) may be induced by a degenerate posterior, which cannot be spread. 
. Therefore, even when sender 1's payoffΠ (u) exhibits an upward-kink at u = u 1 , sender 1 cannot spread the posterior distribution at u = u 1 to increase the payoff. Therefore, using strategy G depicted in Figure 8 -(c) turns out to be a best response to G.
Nevertheless, the linear structure of Π posterior (p; G) implies certain properties of Π (u; G), which in turn will provide us a necessary and sufficient condition for the unique symmetric equilibriums strategy, as well as a simple algorithm that constructs the unique symmetric equilibrium of M-state-N-sender symmetric-sender game.
To facilitate the further discussion, without loss of generality, below we assume that a sender uses a strategy G such that u ∈ supp G is induced by a convex combination of up to two elements in Ω. This is because for any underlying strategy G, there exists another strategy G such that (p 0 , · · · , p M−1 ) ∈ supp G implies p m + p m = 1 for some m, m ; and induces an identical distribution over expected qualities as G. (11) Also, below, when there is no confusion, we say strategy G to refer both the strategy as a distribution over posteriors and the distribution of expected qualities F G that G induces. 
Linear Structure of Payoff Functions
First, observe that the linear structure ofΠ posterior (p) implies that a symmetric strategy G does not have any atom at u ∈ [u 0 , u M−1 ), i.e., G is continuous on [u 0 , u M−1 ) and G (u 0 ) = 0. Fix a strategy G. Now, let For Π (u) that is piecewise linear, let define the slope of Π (u) on [u m , min {u m+1 ,û}] by s m . Also, for notational simplicity, define the slope of Π (u) on u˜ı (û) ,û , whereĩ (û) = arg max m {u m <û} by s − (û), and the slope of the line that goes through (û, Π (û)) and (u M−1 , Π (u M−1 )) by s + (û), respectively.
We now look at the property at the "top" of equilibrium strategy G. There are three possibilities. One possibility is that G does not have an atom at u M−1 . Case (i) below covers this possibility. Also see Figure   9 -(d). If G has an atom at u M−1 , there are two possibilities. One possibility is that s − (û) < s + (û) as in Figure 9 -(b). This happens only when u M−1 does not induce any u ≤û because for otherwise such a u can be spread to increase the payoff. In other words,
(ii) covers this possibility. The other possibility is that s − (û) = s + (û), which is covered by case (iii). Also see Figure 9 -(b).
Definition 3 (Atom condition)
We say a payoff function Π (u) satisfies the atom condition if there exists aû ∈ Figure 9 : Properties m, M − 1, M, and M + 1 (N = 2)
As we have seen, the linear structure ofΠ posterior (p) does not necessarily imply s m = s m+1 because u m+1 maybe induced by a degenerate posterior p, i.e., p such that p m+1 = 1 and p m = 0 for all m = m + 1. The linear structure ofΠ posterior (p), however, rules out the possibility that s m > s m+1 , i.e., an non-upward kink of Π (u) at u m . Because if s m > s m+1 , then a sender will benefit from contracting expected qualities in the neighborhood of u m+1 into u m+1 . Furthermore, notice that if s m < s m+1 is the case, i.e., Π (u) exhibits an upward-kink at u m+1 , then u < u m+1 is not induced by a convex combination
Otherwise an upward-kink of Π (u) at u m+1 implies that a sender can benefit from spreading such a u to u < u and u > u m+1 . For a similar reason, u > u m+1
is not induced by a convex combination of u k ∈ {u m+2 , · · · , u M−1 } and u k ∈ {u 0 , · · · , u m }.
Definition 4 (Upward-Kink Condition)
We say a payoff function Π (u) satisfies the upward-kink condition if Π (u) has an upward kink at u m , then there does not exist any u ∈ [u 0 , u M−1 ] that is induced by the convex combination of u k and u k , where j ∈ {0, · · · , m} and j ∈ {m + 2, · · · , M − 1} under G.
Definition 5 (Generalized Linear Structure)
We say a strategy G that satisfies the weak-Bayes-plausibility induces the payoff function Π (u) with the generalized linear structure if there exists aû such that G is increasing on [u 0 ,û] and constant on [û, u M−1 ); and Π (u) satisfies the piecewise linearity, the atom condition, and the upwardkink condition.
Below, by offering a simple algorithm that constructs the unique symmetric equilibrium, we show that the generalized linear structure of the payoff function is a necessary and sufficient condition of a symmetric equilibrium.
Algorithm and Sufficiency
In this subsection, we briefly describe how the algorithm constructs the unique equilibrium. More formal description of the algorithm is relegated to Appendix A.
Suppose tentatively we know that the equilibrium strategy G has k-th kink at u I k . Because we know that Π (u) satisfies the generalized linear structure, exactly one of the following properties follows.
Property-m :
The first upward kink after u I k occurs at u i ∈ u I k +1 , · · · , u M−2 , i.e., Π (u) is linear on the interval u I k , u i and has an upward kink at u i .
Figure 9 illustrate those properties. We now argue that we can find the slope of the right-derivative of Π at u I k . Now define a sequence of "slopes" s k+1 m , m ∈ {I k , I k + 1, ..., M + 1}, as follows. For simplicity of exposition, we illustrate the case for N = 2 here. See Appendix A for the formal description that covers any N. For m ∈ {I k + 1, · · · , M − 2}, s k+1 m be the slope of Π when Π has k + 1's upward kink at u m . This is defined using the two expressions for E G u|u ∈ u I k , u m . Since Π (u) (= G (u)) is linear on u I k , u m , E G u|u ∈ u I k , u m is the mid-point of u I k and u m . At the same time, by the weak-Bayes-
. Therefore, if there exists α ∈ (0, 1) that equates two expressions for E G u|u ∈ u I k+1 , u m , then the slope s k+1 m is defined to be If s j = ∞, then we know that Π does not satisfy Property-j. The converse is not necessarily true: even if s j < ∞, Π may not satisfy Property-j. However, as we formally prove in the appendix (Lemma 6), if s j < s j < ∞ for some j and j , or s j = s j and j < j, then we can conclude that the equilibrium strategy does not satisfy Property-j . Intuitively, this is because the keeping the value of Π (u) as low as possible slacks the constraints, i.e., the upward-kink condition and the atom condition at the top for higher values of u.
Consequently, we can identify the property that G satisfies by finding the largest index that minimizes
. Since a symmetric equilibrium always exists, starting the process from I 0 , the algorithm constructs the unique equilibrium payoff function Π (u; G) by identifying upward kinks.
Theorem 8 A Bayes-plausible strategy G is an equilibrium if and only if the induced payoff function Π (u; G) has the generalized linear structure. The symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. If N = 2, then the equilibrium is unique and symmetric. The algorithm described above constructs the unique symmetric equilibrium.
We also can show that as the number of senders goes to infinity, we have the full disclosure in the limit.
More formally, let G Full (u) be the strategy that corresponds to full disclosure, i.e.,
Theorem 9 Let G N be the unique symmetric equilibrium strategy of the game. Then, G N (u) converges to G Full (u) in distribution.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed how difference in competitive environments affects the equilibrium information disclosure. Our results highlight notable differences in competition in setting prices a la Perloff and Salop (1985) and in information disclosure among firms with differentiated products.
When firms with differentiated products compete in setting prices, prices decreases as the products become more substitutable; and the price converges to the marginal costs of production as the number of firms approaches infinity. In the context of competition in information disclosure, the ex-ante correlation of proposal qualities can be understood as the "substitutability" of proposals. Our results in Section 4 suggest that if we fix the "substitutability" of proposals, then the increase in the number of competitors will likely to lead to more information disclosure through a mechanism similar to that of price competition.
In contrast, our results in Section 3 identify the novel mechanisms through which an increase in the substitutability of proposals affects the incentives in information disclosure. As we discussed in the paper, due to the informational externality effects, the "demand" for a sender's proposal is not necessarily increasing in the quality of signals he induces (fixing the other senders' strategy). Consequently, as it was the case for symmetric senders, the increase in substitutability of proposals can result in less information disclosure in the unique equilibrium. However, as long as two senders are asymmetric, irrespective how small the difference in ex-ante proposal qualities is, a sufficiently large substitutability will intensify the competition in information disclosure to the point that both senders disclose almost full information in the limit through receiver's "endogenous" unequal treatment of senders in the equilibrium.
We conjecture that the main insights obtained in this paper carries over to more general settings.
Though the full analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, below we discuss the potential extensions of our model, and their likely outcomes.
First of all, we note that the observations, that payoff functions (with respect to posteriors) induced by equilibrium strategies are on the linear functions, extend to more general settings, including the environments. However, whether our finding that the linear structure of payoff function is also a necessary condition requires further investigation.
One of the environments where the linear structure of payoff functions (with respect to posteriors) is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium is likely extend to is the setting where the quality of proposals can take more than three values but proposals' qualities are independent (but not necessarily identical) random variables. Furthermore, the existence of an equilibrium in such an environment can be established by slightly modifying the proof of Theorem 2 appropriately. As we have seen in Section 4.2, however, the linear structure of payoff functions with respect to posteriors does not imply the linear structure of payoff functions with respect to expected utilities induced by posteriors. Though we can easily extend our finding in Section 4 to establish the "local" linearity of payoff functions with respect to expected utilities, whether or not we can establish a simple algorithm like the one we found for symmetric case in Section 4.2 requires further investigation. (12) Second, throughout the analysis, we assumed that the supports of qualities are common across senders.
This assumption is a crucial assumption for the equilibrium existence under the tie-breaking used in this paper. (13) However, the reason of non-existence of an equilibrium is quite similar to the non-existence of an equilibrium in an asymmetric Bertrand game. Therefore, if we allow the tie-breaking rule to be determined as a part of solution a la Simon and Zame (1990) , then since the upper hemi-continuity of payoff correspondences, existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed by Simon and Zame (1990) . (14) Relatedly, in the paper, we assumed that the receiver always chooses one proposal, and a specific tiebreaking rule. As the insights from the auction literature suggests, the receiver is likely to benefit from committing to the inefficient level of "reserve" expected proposal quality. Also, our analysis in Section 4 is indicative that, if possible, the receiver may benefit from committing to treat senders unequally. Investigating how the receiver can intensify the competition through those tools are left for the future research.
Appendix A: Formal Description of Algorithm
Before formally describing the algorithm, we formally define s κ+1 j . Property-m : Suppose equilibrium strategy G satisfies property-i for some i ∈ {I κ + 1, I κ + 2, ..., M − 2}.
(12) One of the difficulties arises in that the lower bounds of the support of equilibrium distributions over expected utilities may differ.
(13) Suppose, e.g., U 1 ∈ {0, 1} with prior Pr (U 1 = 1) = 0.7, whereas U 2 ∈ {0, 2} with prior Pr (U 2 = 2) = 0.1. Then it is straightforward to see that there exists no equilibrium. (14) We appreciate an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
Then, there exists
Note that as the left-hand side of (6) is increasing in α i and its right-hand side is independent of α i , the value of α i is uniquely pinned down by (6). For each i ∈ {I κ + 1, · · · , M − 1}, defineα i as the unique solution to (6) and
Property-M − 1 : Suppose equilibrium strategy G satisfies property-M − 1. There exists ,
Notice that this Property-M − 1 holds only if I κ ∈ {0, · · · , M − 3}. Letũ M−1 as the solution to equation (8) (inû M−1 ); and define
There can be at most oneũ M−1 ∈ (u I κ , u M−1 ) that solves (8). Thus s κ+1 M−1 is well-defined.
Property-M : Suppose equilibrium strategy G satisfies Property-M. There exists an α
Notice that the slopes of
respectively. The atom condition requires these slopes coincide, i.e.,
Equations (10) and (11) form a pair of simultaneous equations in (α M ,û M ). Define (α M ,ũ M ) as the solution to the system of equations (10) and (11), and
Property-M + 1 : Suppose equilibrium strategy G satisfies property-M + 1. Then,
For future reference, defineũ M+1 as the solution to equation (13), and
That is, s defined by (7) , (9) , (12) , and (14).
Calculate the largest index
,and χ κ calculated above as output.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose p 1 , p 2 ∈ (0, 1). By a direct application of Bayes' rule,
, and
The inequality above can be rewritten as:
Consequently, the inequality holds if and only if
It remains to consider p 1 , p 2 ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}. If
holds if and only if p 2 = 0. If
Finally, if p 2 = 1, Pr (U 1 = u 1 |p 1 , p 2 ) ≥ 1 = Pr (U 2 = u 1 |p 1 , p 2 ) holds if and only if p 1 = 1. In sum, for all
The function δ is increasing and concave because
and
Furthermore, the function δ is increasing in ρ:
Finally, if ρ = 0, then k = 1 and δ (p) = p. As ρ → (1 − π 1 ) π 2 , then k → 0 and δ (p) converges pointwise to 1 {p>0} . Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1
Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Linear Stucture: We extensively use the following two claims, which are direct implications of Corollary 2 of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) . (a) A strategy G i is a best response to G j if and only if
The sufficiency is straightforward. To see the necessity, suppose that (G 1 , G 2 ) is a pair of equilibrium strategies. We first make the following preliminary observavtions.
Lemma 3 (i) Suppose G j (q 1 ) − G j (q 0 ) = 0 and G j (q 1 ) < 1. Then, Π i p; G j is linear and weakly decreas-
ds is constant, we have the required result.
(15) That is, C Π i p; G j ≡ sup {z| (p, z) ∈ co (Π i )}, where co (Π i ) is the convex hull of the graph of Π i .
(ii) Notice that D ≡ Π i (q2;Gj)−Πi(q0;Gj)
where D ≡ Π i (q2;Gj)−Πi(q0;Gj)
where the last inequality follows from the observation that 1
where the final inequality follows from the observation that 1
We show below the following properties.
If such an equilibrium exists, then sender j's payoff is zero. However, sender j can always attain a positive payoff by full disclosure, a contradiction. Next, suppose π i ≤ δ j p j . Then it is straightforward to see that there exists a mean-preserving contraction G i of G i such that G i (p) > G i (p) for all p ∈ 0, δ j p j , and
(ii) no atom at any p ∈ (0, 1) and G 1 (0) × G 2 (0) = 0: Suppose G i assigns an atom atp ∈ (0, 1). Then Π i p; G j = C Π i p; G j , and Π j exhibits an upward jump at δ i (p). Therefore, there eixists an ε > 0 such
and Π i p; G j is weakly decreasing and linear on
However, by the previous claim, we havep j > δ i (p), a contradiction. Next, suppose G i assigns an atom atp = 0. Then,
(16) To see this, notice that the inequality obviously holds if
(17) Replacing δ i (q 2 ) with δ i (q 0 ) in the previous footnote gives this inequality.
. Then, applying the same argument for Π i p; G j , we obtain that there exists an ε > 0 such that Π i p; G j < C Π i p; G j for all p ∈ a, δ j (δ i (b) + ε) + ε , which contradicts the definition of b.
Then, by the definition ofp i , we havep i =p j = 1, and G i assigns an atom atp i . Also, this implies that
Then the argument similar to the one in claim (iii) implies that Π j p j ;
Now we argue that properties (i)-(iv) together imply the linear structure of the payoff functions. Take two arbitrary points p, p ∈ supp G i \ {0} such that p > p. Suppose also that there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such
to G j only if G i assigns measure zero to (p − , p + ). This however contradicts that G i is strictly increasing on (p, p ). Next, suppose Π i p ; G j > αΠ i p; G j + (1 − α) Π i p ; G j . Then if G i is the best response of sender i, then it cannot assign positive measures to the neighbourhoods of all of p, p , and p , contradicting that p, p , p ∈ supp G. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
Since d 2 Π i p i ; G j dp 2
, the equilibrium strategy G j on 0,p j can be written as
, we obtain (3). By the Bayes-plausibility con-
Upon rearranging, we obtain 1
The rest of the proof is an immediate corollary of Theorem 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2
Equilibrium Existence: The strategy space is compact (with respect to weak*-topology). The payoff
, and hence is quasiconcave in G i . The game is zerosum, i.e., V 1 (G 1 , G 2 ) + V 2 (G 2 , G 1 ) = 1, and hence satisfies reciprocal upper-semicontinuity. Therefore, if we show that the payoff function satisfies payoff security, Corollary 3.3 of Reny (1999) guarantees the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Fix an arbitrary strategy profile (G i , G −i ) and ε > 0.
We show below that there exists a strategyG i of sender i that is continuous on [0, 1) and
We thus have the payoff security at (G i , G −i ).
Equilibrium Uniqueness: Suppose there are two equilibria (G 1 , G 2 ) and G 1 , G 2 . Definep i andp i , as well asp 1 andp 1 accordingly. Then, by the interchangeability of zero-sum game, (G 1 , G 2 ) and G 1 , G 2 are also equilibria. As a result, G 1 and G 1 have a common support, i.e.,p 1 =p 1 andp 1 =p 1 . Similarly, G 2 , and G 2 have a common support, i.e.,p 2 =p 2 andp 2 =p 2 . In other words, the support of equilibrium startegies are unique. Finally, we explain why this, together with Bayes-plaubsilibity and the necessity of the linear structure of equilibrium strategy uniquely pins down the equilibrium strategy.
If G 1 (p 1 ) = 1, then the simplified Bayes-plausibility found in Lemma 2 gives us a unique p i as T j (p i ) is increasing inp i . Next, suppose G 1 (p 1 ) < 1. By the simplified Bayes-plausibility found in Lemma 2, if G i (0) = 0 (and hence
verify that there exists unique pair of G j (0) and G j (p i ) that simultaneously satisfy this equaiton and
Proof of Theorem 3
Since the game is zero-sum and symmetric, Theorem 2 implies that the equilibrium is unique and sym-
. By Lemma 4, G (0) = 0 in a symmetric equilibrium. By by Lemma 2, in an equilibrium such that G (p) = 1, we havê p = 2π; and G (p) = min
Also, in an equilibrium such that G (p) < 1, we have πΠ (1) = 1 2 by the linear structure of the payoff function. Then, Lemma 4, we obtain
Let Gρ (p) be the equilibrium strategy when ρ =ρ. Similarly, definepρ ≡ sup supp Gρ ∩ (0, 1) . Take a pair ρ, ρ ∈ [0, π (1 − π)] with ρ > ρ.
First, suppose π ≤ 1/2. By 15, for p < 2π,
Thus,
Next, suppose π > 1/2. Observe that bothp and G (p), as given by equations (16), are increasing in ρ.
Moreover, for p <p,
∂ρ is given by equation (17) 
Proof of Theorem 4
We use T ρ i to denote the the value of T i found in Lemma 2 when the covariance of qualities is ρ. We usep 
2 in distribution as ρ →ρ. Lastly, it is straightforward to check that lim ρ→ρ Π 1 p; G ρ 2 = 1 for all p ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, we have the required result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5
That the linear structure is necessary and sufficient for a symmetric equilibrium can be obtained through a straightforward modification of the proof of Theorem 1.
To see the uniqueness, notice that
. Therefore,
Furthermore, the linear structure of Π requires that G (p) < 1 implies
is increasing in g,
However, the linear structure of the payoff functions implies
, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 6
For notational simplicity, we use G N to represent the unique symmetric equilibrium when the number of senders is N. Consider N 1 and N 2 > N 1 . In the light of the proof of Theorem 5, we start with
By (18) and (19), we obtain π = is decreasing in N, Π 1,
Therefore, on 0,p N 1 , while G
The cases where N 2 ≤ 1/π and N 1 ≤ 1/π < N 2 can be shown in a similar manner, and hence omitted.
Lastly, for N > 1/π, g N is decreasing in N and π = 
Proof of Theorem 7
The sufficiency is straightforward. We thus only show the necessity. In order to do so, we intro-
We useπ m to denote a degenerate posterior p such that
By Corollary 2 of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) : (a) a strategy G is a best response to payoff function
First, we show that F G does not have atom at any u ∈ [u 0 , u M−1 ). If there is, then Π (p; G) < C (Π (p; G)) for all p ∈ P (u). However, by assumption, G (supp G ∩ P (u)) > 0, which is a contradiction.
to the maximality of (u l , u h ).
−n 1 − x n−1 < 0. Therefore,
Proof of Theorem 8
We first prove the following two lemmata.
Lemma 5 Suppose a weak-Bayes plausible G induces Π (u) with the generalized linear structure, and Π (u) has a k-th upward kink at u I k . Consider u m and u m such that
Proof.
. This implies that there exist
β j π j . Therefore, by Bayes' rule, we have
For notational simplicity, let
N−1 , which in turn allows us to compute the conditional expectation as follows:
Recall that ζ 
Similarly, there exist α I k ∈ (0, 1) and α m such that 
Notice that RHS of (28) satisfies ∑ 
